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Notes and Comments
Bowen v. Kendrick: A New Era of
Doctrinal Funding?
I. Introduction
Religious controversy played a significant role in the estab-
lishment of English-speaking colonies in North America.1 When
those colonies later coalesced to form the United States of
America, political leaders were understandably haunted by the
example of European sectarian strife looming in the background.
They expressed their concerns with an attempt, in the Constitu-
tion, to delineate the proper relationship of church and state
within the overall polity. It is, therefore, a matter of constitu-
tional importance that "whenever the State itself speaks on a
religious subject, one of the questions that we must ask is
'whether the government intends to convey a message of en-
dorsement or disapproval of religion.' "2 Recently, the United
States Supreme Court decided an important case which
presented this question of state endorsement of religion in the
context of a controversial congressional initiative.
In Bowen v. Kendrick,3 the Supreme Court upheld the con-
stitutionality of the Adolescent Family Life Act of 1981 (AFLA
or Act)4 which provides federal funds to individual grantees for
their services and research in promoting sexual abstinence
among adolescents. The plaintiffs' challenge to the AFLA in fed-
1. Among the colonies founded as religious havens were the Massachusetts Bay Col-
ony (Puritans), Maryland (Catholics), and Pennsylvania (Quakers). A. NEVINS & H.S.
COMMAGER, A SHORT HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 23-28 (5th ed. 1966).
2. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 60-61 (1985) (striking down Alabama state spon-
sored moment of silent prayer or meditation) (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668,
690-91 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
3. 108 S. Ct. 2562 (1988).
4. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300z-300z-10 (1981 & Supp. 1988).
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eral district court resulted in a grant of summary judgment for
the plaintiffs. The court declared that the Act, both on its face
and as applied, violated the establishment clause of the first
amendment.' By a five to four decision,6 the Supreme Court re-
versed the lower court's holding and found the AFLA to be con-
stitutional on its face. The case was remanded to the district
court for consideration of whether, under certain criteria, the
Act was unconstitutional as applied in specific individual grants
of federal funds.
This decision accomplishes three things: first, it legitimizes
a novel legislative approach to social policy under the first
amendment; second, it confers majority status on what was for-
merly a minority view of the underlying basis of the establish-
ment clause; and third, it dramatically changes the Lemon test,'
which since 1971 has been the analytical vehicle utilized by the
Court in this area. With Justice Powell's departure from the
Court, and his replacement by Justice Kennedy, a change in es-
tablishment clause jurisprudence has taken place.8
Part II of this Note examines the interpretive history of
the establishment clause, both before and after Lemon v.
Kurtzman.9 The facts and holding of Bowen v. Kendrick are set
forth in Part III, as is a discussion of the AFLA. Part IV exam-
ines the meaning and potential implications of the decision for
establishment clause jurisprudence. This Note concludes, in
Part V, that a strict application of the Lemon test would have
prevented the unfortunate result in Bowen v. Kendrick, in which
the new and dangerous practice of doctrinal funding' ° was
5. Kendrick v. Bowen, 657 F. Supp. 1547 (D.D.C. 1987), rev'd and remanded, 108 S.
Ct. 2562 (1988).
6. See infra note 125.
7. This test originated in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). See infra notes
41-55 and accompanying text.
8. For a discussion of the speculation surrounding the "unknown" Justice Kennedy's
possible impact on a closely divided Supreme Court, see Williams, The Opinions of
Anthony Kennedy - No Time for Ideology, 74 A.B.A. J. 56 (March 1988). "[D]espite
having written more than 430 opinions during his 12 years on the 9th Circuit, and de-
spite having undergone questioning by the same Senate Judiciary Committee that metic-
ulously dissected Bork, no one knows how a Justice Kennedy would treat the most divi-
sive issue of our day .... Id.
9. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
10. In this Note the term "doctrinal funding" is used to mean the calculated legisla-
tive decision to financially support a religious message in order to achieve a secular goal.
[Vol. 9:341
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approved.
II. Background
The first amendment to the United States Constitution pro-
vides, in pertinent part, that "Congress shall make no law re-
specting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free ex-
ercise thereof . . . ."" Thus, there are two "religion clauses" in
the Constitution: the establishment clause12 and the free exer-
cise clause,"3 with separate jurisprudence emanating from each.1'
A. The Animating Principle
Two interpretations of the establishment clause have com-
peted for the allegiance of a majority of the Supreme Court. 5
One view is that the clause compels the separation, as far as
possible, of religion and any state undertaking. 6 The other view
See infra notes 155-160 and accompanying text.
11. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
12. The establishment clause was made applicable to the states via the fourteenth
amendment in Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947).
13. The free exercise clause was made applicable to the states via the fourteenth
amendment in Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 305 (1940).
14. There is a fundamental tension between the two clauses. See Walz v. Tax
Comm'n, 397 U.S. 646, 668-69 (1970). "The Court has struggled to find a neutral course
between the two Religion Clauses, both of which are cast in absolute terms, and either of
which, if expanded to a logical extreme, would tend to clash with the other." Id. See
generally Freund, Public Aid to Parochial Schools, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1680 (1969);
Choper, The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment: Reconciling the Conflict, 41 U.
PiTT. L. REV. 673 (1980).
15. A remarkable number of Supreme Court opinions have been concerned with the
historical background of the adoption of the first amendment religion clauses. See, e.g.,
Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 67 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment); id. at
91-114 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 787-92 (1983) (ma-
jority opinion of Burger, C.J.); Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 230-38
(1963) (Brennan, J., concurring); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 425-36 (1962) (majority
opinion of Black, J.); Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 244-48
(1948) (Reed, J., dissenting); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 8-16 (1947) (majority
opinion of Black, J.); id. at 31-43 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
16. In Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. at 15-16, 31-32, both Justice Black, writ-
ing for the majority, and Justice Rutledge, dissenting, accepted and developed this view.
While the two Justices disagreed on the result to be reached in this case (state funding of
school bus transportation for parochial school children), their opinions, taken together,
present a coherent historical view. According to the Justices, the opinions of Jefferson
and Madison are the best bases for an understanding of the religion clauses of the first
amendment. Jefferson urged a "wall of separation between church and State." Id. at 16
19891
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is that only government preferences among competing faiths or
the creation of a nationally established church are prohibited.
Thus, a certain religious-secular overlap is permissible. 7
Under the first theory, almost all attempts by government
to aid religion are suspect, and most are unconstitutional. '8
Under the second theory, "[tihe Establishment Clause [does]
not require government neutrality between religion and irreli-
gion nor [does] it prohibit the Federal Government from provid-
ing nondiscriminatory aid to religion." 9 Both theories purport
to express the view of the drafters of the first amendment.20
The Supreme Court has embraced the separation theory in
its decisions beginning with Everson v. Board of Education,2 al-
though by gradually shrinking margins. In Wallace v. Jaffree,22
a case in which the separation theory retained its controlling in-
fluence, Justice Rehnquist devoted a twenty-four page dissent2'
to an historical study of the adoption of the religion clauses and
concluded that the separation theory was incorrect.24 The major-
ity's erroneous interpretation of the historical framework of the
clause, according to Justice Rehnquist, had led to inconsistent
results in many cases involving challenges to legislative attempts
(quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878)). Madison counseled a strict
separation of church and state to avoid "a corrupting coalition or alliance between
them." 9 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 487 (G. Hunt ed. 1910).
17. Justice Rehnquist embraced this position in his dissent in Wallace v. Jaffree, 472
U.S. at 106 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). In brief, this position is that "Justice Rutledge
sold his brethren a bill of goods when he persuaded them that the 'establishment of
religion' clause of the First Amendment was intended to rule out all governmental 'aid to
all religions.'" Corwin, The Supreme Court as a National School Board, 14 LAW & CON-
TEMP. PROBS. 3, 16 (1949). Some linkage between government and a specific religion is
also required for a finding of unconstitutionality. See Wallace, 472 U.S. at 112 (Rehn-
quist, J., dissenting).
18. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1166-67 (2d ed. 1988).
19. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 106 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
20. The literature on this question is immense. See generally Van Alstyne, Trends
in the Supreme Court: Mr. Jefferson's Crumbling Wall - A Comment on Lynch v.
Donnelly, 1984 DUKE L.J. 770. For the precursor to the Rehnquist view, see Corwin,
supra note 17. For the view that neither position is historically correct, see L. LEvy, THE
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE: RELIGION AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1986).
21. 330 U.S. 1 (1947). See also supra note 16.
22. 472 U.S. 38.
23. Id. at 91-114 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
24. Id. at 112. "If a constitutional theory has no basis in the history of the amend-
ment it seeks to interpret, is difficult to apply and yields unprincipled results, I see little
use in it." Id.
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol9/iss2/5
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to aid religiously affiliated schools.2"
This dispute over the historical interpretation of the views
of the drafters of the first amendment has been a critical one in
the development of first amendment jurisprudence. 26 The views
are quite different. While both would prohibit a federal "estab-
lishment" of religion, Justice Rehnquist's view would allow a
church-state nexus on any issue, provided only that no national
religion is designated or that no specific religious group is pre-
ferred over another.2
7
B. Judicial Interpretation of the Establishment Clause
The initial standard of analysis used by the Supreme Court
in its consideration of the establishment clause was the "wall of
separation" espoused in Everson v. Board of Education.28 This
standard was also the basis for the Court's holdings in Illinois ex
rel. McCollum v. Board of Education2' and Zorach v. Clauson,30
25. Id. at 106-07.
Notwithstanding the absence of a historical basis for this theory of rigid separa-
tion, the wall idea might well have served as a useful albeit misguided analytical
concept, had it led this Court to unified and principled results in Establishment
Clause cases. The opposite, unfortunately, has been true; in the 38 years since
Everson our Establishment Clause cases have been neither principled nor unified.
Id.
26. Should the views of the framers, even if they could be accurately determined 200
years after the event, constitute the principal guide to interpretation of the establish-
ment clause? For one view, see Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 236
(1963) (Brennan, J., concurring) ("A more fruitful inquiry ... is whether the practices
here challenged threaten those consequences which the Framers deeply feared; whether,
in short, they tend to promote that type of interdependence between religion and state
which the First Amendment was designed to prevent."). But cf. E. Meese, Toward a
Jurisprudence of Original Intention, 2 BENCHMARK 1 (revised version of remarks made
to the American Bar Association, July 9, 1985).
27. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 113 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). "The Framers intended the
Establishment Clause to prohibit the designation of any church as a 'national' one. The
Clause was also designated to stop the Federal Government from asserting a preference
for one religious denomination or sect over others." Id.
28. 330 U.S. 1. "The First Amendment has erected a wall between church and state.
That wall must be kept high and impregnable." Id. at 18. The actual phrase "wall of
separation" is Thomas Jefferson's. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878)
(quoting Jefferson's letter to the Danbury Baptist Association). See also supra notes 16-
18 and accompanying text.
29. 333 U.S. 203 (1948) (disallowing instruction by religious teachers in the public
schools during the school day).
30. 343 U.S. 306 (1952) (allowing early release of public school students to partici-
pate in religious instruction at other locations).
5
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as the Court attempted to determine where the "wall" should be
erected. The "purpose and effect" test articulated in Abington
School District v. Schempp,3 ' aided this determination. In
Schempp, the Court held that a public school program allowing
voluntary Bible reading or the use of prayer had the effect of
advancing religion 2 and was unconstitutionally motivated by a
religious purpose.3 3 A further refinement, excessive entangle-
ment,34 was introduced by Justice Harlan in his concurring opin-
ions in Board of Education v. Allen3 5 and Walz v. Tax Com-
mission.16 Justice Harlan cautioned that such church-state in-
volvement could possibly result in political disharmony. 7
In 1971 the Court combined the analytical strands of pur-
pose, effect, and entanglement from previous cases to decide
Lemon v. Kurtzman.8 The Court has continued to use this
three-prong test which emerged from Lemon as the touchstone
of establishment clause analysis.39 In addition, the test has
sometimes been augmented by a recognition of "political divi-
siveness '"40 as a factor of constitutional concern. Dramatic alter-
31. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
The test may be stated as follows: what are the purpose and the primary effect of
the enactment? If either is the advancement or inhibition of religion then the
enactment exceeds the scope of legislative power as circumscribed by the Consti-
tution. That is to say that to withstand the strictures of the Establishment Clause
there must be a secular legislative purpose and a primary effect that neither ad-
vances nor inhibits religion.
Id. at 222.
32. Id. at 223-25.
33. Id.
34. See infra text accompanying note 48.
35. 392 U.S. 236, 249 (1968) (upholding program which provided textbooks for secu-
lar studies to parochial school students) (Harlan, J., concurring).
36. 397 U.S. 664, 694 (1970) (upholding granting of tax exemptions to religious
properties) (Harlan, J., concurring).
37. Id. at 695.
38. 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971). See infra notes 42-58 and accompanying text.
39. See Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 394 (1983) (stating that the L'emon test pro-
vides "[tihe general nature of our inquiry in this area .... ").
40. Political divisiveness was first mentioned as one of the elements making up en-
tanglement in Lemon, 403 U.S. at 622-24. It was, however, not the deciding factor in the
decision; it merely reinforced the Court's conclusions as to the desirability of the chal-
lenged program, which was invalidated because of excessive administrative entangle-
ment. Id. In subsequent cases, however, the concept of potential political divisiveness
seemed to blossom into a full-blown fourth prong of the test for constitutionality. See,
e.g., Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 365 n.15, 372 (1975) (auxiliary aid programs to
parochial school students invalidated in part because of political divisiveness); Commit-
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol9/iss2/5
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ations occurred in Bowen v. Kendrick,41 however, and the Court
now appears launched on a new era of establishment clause
interpretation.
C. The Lemon Test
Lemon v. Kurtzman42 involved, as have many other estab-
lishment clause cases, a challenge to the use of public funds to
aid parochial schools. The challenged statutes were Pennsylva-
nia43 and Rhode Island"" enactments which provided public
funds for teachers' salaries in nonpublic schools, including paro-
chial schools."5 In striking down the statutes, Chief Justice
Burger, writing for the Court, articulated a three-prong test for
analysis of statutes that are challenged under the establishment
clause. The Court stated: "First, the statute must have a secular
legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must
be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the
statute must not foster 'an excessive entanglement with reli-
gion.' )146
The meaning of each prong emerges from an analysis of the
test in light of the specific facts in Lemon. The purpose prong
requires an evaluation of the "stated legislative intent" of the
statute.47 In Lemon, the Court found a valid secular legislative
tee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 795-98 (1973) (neutral
tuition voucher plan invalidated at least in part because aid to parochial school students
would cause political division). In Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985) (remedial educa-
tion programs and services provided to parochial school students by state grants of fed-
eral funds struck down), Justice Powell seemed to say that political divisiveness was a
reason for a strict application of the purpose, effect, and entanglement prongs of the test.
Id. at 416-17. "[Tlhere remains a considerable risk of continuing political strife over the
propriety of direct aid to religious schools and the proper allocation of limited govern-
mental resources." Id. at 416. Thus it seems fair to conclude that political divisiveness
has on occasion been a wild card in the interpretation of cases under the establishment
clause.
41. 108 S. Ct. 2562 (1988).
42. 403 U.S. 602.
43. Id. at 607 n.1.
44. Id. at 609 n.3.
45. Id. at 606-11.
46. Id. at 612-13 (citations omitted).
47. Id. at 613. A valid secular purpose has been found lacking by the Supreme Court
in four cases: Edwards v. Aguillard, 107 S. Ct. 2573, 2578-84 (1987) (statute requiring
equal treatment for evolution and "creation science" in public school classrooms invali-
dated); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 56 (1985) (statute mandating moment of silence
1989]
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purpose in maintaining minimum standards in all schools within
a state.4 The Court suggested that an appropriate inquiry for
the effect prong would be whether, in spite of the validity of the
stated or presumed secular purpose, religion was in fact imper-
missibly advanced.4 In Lemon, however, the Court did not actu-
ally undertake this inquiry because it found that the challenged
statutes violated the entanglement prong."
Determining whether entanglement exists, according to the
Court, involves an examination of "the character and purposes
of the institutions that are benefited, the nature of the aid that
the State provides, and the resulting relationship between the
government and the religious authority."'" In applying these cri-
teria to the facts in Lemon, the Court first found that the aided
institutions - Catholic elementary and secondary schools -
were an essential element of the Catholic Church.5 2 The strict
religious atmosphere of such schools made it likely that religion
would be advanced, although perhaps unintentionally, in secular
courses taught there." Second, the Court found that the nature
of the aid provided - subsidies for teachers' salaries - would
create difficulties for monitoring because teachers, unlike text-
books, could not be examined in advance to insure that they
would not attempt to inculcate religion. 4 Third, the Court
found that an extensive monitoring program amounting to per-
manent surveillance would be necessary to "police" this legisla-
for voluntary silent prayer or meditation struck down); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39,
41-42 (1980) (statute requiring public school classroom posting of the Ten Command-
ments invalidated); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 107 (1968) (statute prohibiting
teaching of evolution struck down).
48. 403 U.S. at 613.
49. Id. at 613-14. A good discussion of the effects prong is found in School Dist. v.
Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 393-94 (1985) (an indirect subsidy to parochial schools may have the
unintended unconstitutional effect of advancing religion).
50. 403 U.S. at 613-14.
51. Id. at 615.
52. Id. at 616. "[T]he District Court concluded that the parochial schools consti-
tuted 'an integral part of the religious mission of the Catholic Church.' The various char-
acteristics of the schools make them 'a powerful vehicle for transmitting the Catholic
faith to the next generation.' " Id.
53. Id. at 618-19.
54. Id. at 619. "Unlike a book, a teacher cannot be inspected once so as to determine
the extent and intent of his or her personal beliefs and subjective acceptance of the
limitations imposed by the First Amendment." Id.
[Vol. 9:341
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tion,5 5 and that the resulting relationship between religious and
secular authorities would compromise both.5
Chief Justice Burger's majority opinion also discussed polit-
ical divisiveness as a kind of entanglement that the establish-
ment clause was designed to prevent.5 7 Political divisiveness in
this case would arise from the necessity for annual appropria-
tions, insuring that the issue would remain a politically polariz-
ing one, pitting one sect against another.58
The Lemon decision broke new ground in two ways. First,
by combining the methodology and terminology of previous
cases, it provided a framework for future analysis of establish-
ment clause cases. Second, in its extensive treatment of the ex-
cessive entanglement concept, the decision provided the Court
with a firm basis with which to examine church-state overlap in
future cases.
D. Applying the Lemon Test
Since 1971 the Supreme Court has had frequent occasion to
interpret the establishment clause, and in so doing it has used
the Lemon test as its analytical vehicle. The cases considered
may be divided into four main groupings: (1) aid to parochial
schools; (2) grants to institutions; (3) long-standing practices;
and (4) nonfinancial enactments. Distinctions have been drawn
by the Court in its treatment of each grouping.
1. State Financial and Programmatic Aid to Parochial
Schools
Prior to Lemon v. Kurtzman, s the Supreme Court upheld
state programs which provided basic student transportation, °
55. Id. "A comprehensive, discriminating, and continuing state surveillance will in-
evitably be required to ensure that these restrictions are obeyed .... These prophylactic
contacts will involve excessive and enduring entanglement between state and church."
Id.
56. Id. at 620.
57. Id. at 622. "[Plolitical division along religious lines was one of the principal evils
against which the First Amendment was intended to protect." Id. See also supra note 40
and accompanying text.
58. Id. at 623.
59. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
60. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
19891
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textbooks,"1 and tax-exempt status to church properties.2 Since
the advent of the Lemon test in 1971, however, the Court has
interpreted the establishment clause to mean that very little aid
may go to religious primary and secondary schools. In a series of
narrowly decided cases, the Court struck down most attempts by
states to aid parochial schools using the criteria developed in
Lemon.6
2. Grant Programs to Institutions
In Bradfield v. Roberts," the Supreme Court upheld a grant
of funds to a hospital with a religious affiliation. This early case,
therefore, stands for the proposition that not all programs which
aid religiously affiliated institutions violate the establishment
clause. The difficulty lies in determining how to distinguish be-
tween acceptable and unacceptable institutional recipients of
funds. In Hunt v. McNair,68 Justice Powell delineated a test for
evaluating the effect of aid to an institution under the establish-
ment clause:
Aid normally may be thought to have a primary effect of ad-
vancing religion when it flows to an institution in which religion is
61. Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
62. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 646 (1970).
63. See Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985) (state provision of remedial services to
parochial school students on public school grounds struck down via entanglement prong
plus the political divisiveness factor); School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985) (state
provision of nonreligious instruction to parochial school students to supplement paro-
chial school curricula struck down via the effect prong); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388
(1983) (state tax statute allowing all taxpayers to deduct their children's tuition costs
upheld); Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646 (1980)
(reimbursement of private schools for expenses incurred in administering standardized
tests and compiling state-required statistical data upheld); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S.
229 (1977) (textbook program, funds for statewide standardized testing, and health and
diagnostic services all provided to parochial schools upheld; loan of instructional materi-
als and use of state school buses for parochial school field trips struck down via the
entanglement prong); Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413
U.S. 756 (1973) (tuition reimbursement, tax benefits, maintenance, and repair of paro-
chial schools struck down via the political divisiveness factor); Levitt v. Committee for
Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty, 413 U.S. 472 (1973) (per-pupil payment to parochial
schools for state-required record keeping and testing struck down via the effect prong);
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (salary supplement to teachers in parochial
schools struck down via the entanglement prong).
64. 175 U.S. 291 (1899).
65. 413 U.S. 734 (1973).
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol9/iss2/5
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so pervasive that a substantial portion of its functions are sub-
sumed in the religious mission or when it funds a specifically reli-
gious activity in an otherwise substantially secular setting.6
In all three cases in which it has considered the issue of
grants to religiously affiliated colleges, 67 the Court, using a "per-
vasively sectarian" test, has upheld the challenged enactment
after applying the three-prong Lemon analysis. In Tilton v.
Richardson," the Court upheld Title I of the Federal Higher
Education Facilities Act of 1963,9 which provided federal grants
to colleges, some religiously affiliated, for the construction of
campus facilities to be used for nonreligious purposes. In Hunt
v. McNair, ° the Court rejected a challenge to a state program
which issued revenue bonds for private colleges, some of which
were religiously affiliated. Similarly, in Roemer v. Board of Pub-
tic Works,71 the Court approved a state annual grant program
for religious colleges based on a percentage of the per-pupil
amount the state spent on its public college students.
The different results reached in cases concerning institu-
tions of higher education from those involving elementary and
secondary schools can be attributed to the differing character of
those institutions. The Court has concluded that, although they
may have some religious affiliation, colleges and universities are
not pervasively sectarian.7 2 That is, they are not presumptively
permeated with religion in the same manner and degree as paro-
chial elementary and secondary schools.
Consequently, aid to such institutions, if restricted to non-
sectarian facets of the institutional operation, will not require an
entangling administrative surveillance to prevent the advance-
ment of religion.7 A mere assurance by the institution and the
66. Id. at 743.
67. Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736 (1976); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S.
734 (1973); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971).
68. 403 U.S. 672. This case was decided the same day as Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403
U.S. 602 (1971).
69. 403 U.S. at 674. For the text of the challenged enactment, see 77 STAT. 364 (cur-
rent version at 20 U.S.C. §§ 711-721 (1964 & Supp. V)).
70. 413 U.S. 734 (1973).
71. 426 U.S. 736.
72. See Roemer, 426 U.S. at 758-60; Hunt, 413' U.S. at 743-44; Tilton, 403 U.S. at
781.
73. Roemer, 426 U.S. at 761-67; Hunt, 413 U.S. at 746; Tilton, 403 U.S. at 687.
19891
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government that the grant money will not be used for religious
purposes will carry much weight.7 ' The Court asserts, further-
more, that college students are not as impressionable as younger
students, and therefore do not require protection from religious
influences to the same degree as did the elementary school stu-
dents identified in Lemon v. Kurtzman .7  Finally, the Court
found that programs of aid to higher education are not signifi-
cantly politically divisive.76
3. Long-Standing Governmental Practices
In three cases decided since 1970, the Supreme Court has
considered establishment clause challenges to long-standing gov-
ernmental practices. 7 In all three cases, the Court used an his-
torical analysis, rather than the test articulated in Lemon, to
conclude that the practice in question was constitutionally be-
nign.78 While an appeal to history "cannot justify contemporary
violations" of the establishment clause,7 9 a history marked by an
absence of controversy over a long-established practice appar-
ently makes more difficult any attempt to prove that religion has
been unconstitutionally advanced.80
4. Nonfinancial Enactments
The Supreme Court has applied the Lemon test in consider-
ing challenges to state legislative enactments which, although
not constituting an attempt to aid an institution financially or
programmatically, nevertheless raise an establishment of religion
issue." These cases have not been particularly troublesome for
74. See Roemer, 426 U.S. at 759.
75. Id. at 764; Tilton, 403 U.S. at 686.
76. Roemer, 426 U.S. at 765; Tilton, 403 U.S. at 688.
77. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984) (continuing display, on public
grounds, of a Christmas nativity scene upheld); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983)
(continuing use of a legislative chaplain who was employed to open the legislative day
with a prayer upheld); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970) (state statute confer-
ring tax-exempt status for church properties upheld).
78. See, e.g., Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. at 792. Such practices are "simply a toler-
able acknowledgement of beliefs widely held among the people of this country." Id.
79. Id. at 790.
80. Id. at 790-92.
81. See, e.g., Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703 (1985) (employment
statute giving worker an absolute right to refuse to work on his preferred sabbath day
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the Court because they have involved either an apparent delega-
tion of a legislative function to a religious body or a demonstra-
ble preference of one religious group over another.
E. The Entanglement Prong Controversy
The Supreme Court has frequently used the entanglement
prong of the Lemon test to strike down legislative enactments as
void under the establishment clause.8 2 This approach has some-
times meant that statutes which demonstrate a valid secular
purpose and appear to further no proscribed end are neverthe-
less unconstitutional because the degree of administrative moni-
toring required to assure that religion is not advanced is itself an
excessive entanglement between church and state.83 This entan-
glement analysis has been controversial and has split the
Court."'
This dispute was sharply highlighted in the 1985 case of
Aguilar v. Felton.5 5 In this case, the majority used the entangle-
ment prong to strike down a New York program which used fed-
eral funds for remedial educational services to students at paro-
chial schools." The four dissenting opinions, taken together,
signify nothing less than a declaration of war against the entan-
glement prong. Chief Justice Burger seemed to disavow his own
struck down because it established a preference for employees with religious beliefs over
those who had no such beliefs); Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982) (statute regulat-
ing charitable contributions struck down because it waived reporting requirements for
religious groups and thus created a dual system which amounted to a "denominational
preference"); Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116 (1982) (zoning law effectively
giving the Roman Catholic Church veto power over the issuance of liquor licenses struck
down).
82. See, e.g., Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229
(1977); Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973);
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
83. See, e.g., Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (statute struck down on basis of entan-
glement prong and the wild card of political divisiveness).
84. Id. at 418.
I recognize the difficult dilemma in which governments are placed by the in-
teraction of the "effects" and entanglement prongs of the Lemon test. Our deci-
sions require governments ... to tread an extremely narrow line between being
certain that the "principal or primary effect" of the aid is not to advance religion
and avoiding excessive entanglement.
Id. (citation omitted).
85. 473 U.S. 402.
86. Id. at 413.
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work when he criticized "the Court's obsession with the criteria
identified in Lemon v. Kurtzman .... ,,87 In a similar vein, Jus-
tice Rehnquist inveighed against "the 'Catch-22' paradox of [the
Court's] own creation whereby aid must be supervised to ensure
no entanglement but the supervision itself is held to cause an
entanglement." '88 Justice O'Connor's dissent embraced the
Rehnquist "paradox" argument89 and pointed out that policing
this statute had involved no entanglement at all, since in the
nineteen years of the program's operation there had not been
one reported attempt to inculcate religion.9
III. Bowen v. Kendrick
A. The Adolescent Family Life Act
Bowen v. Kendrick91 originated in a legal challenge to the
Adolescent Family Life Act of 198192 (AFLA or Act). The AFLA
authorizes the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS)
to award federal grants to individuals and to various public or
nonprofit organizations and agencies for their services and re-
search in promoting several goals, which include increased sex-
ual "self-discipline" among adolescents, the choice of "adoption
as an alternative for adolescent parents," and awareness of "the
consequences of ... contraceptive use."9" Grants are specifically
restricted to programs "which do not advocate, promote, or en-
courage abortion."9 Perhaps not surprisingly, the AFLA has ac-
quired the derisive label of the "Chastity Act."95
The AFLA specifically creates a role for religion within its
87. Id. at 419 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
88. Id. at 420-21 (citation omitted) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
89. Id. at 429 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
90. Id. at 428.
91. 108 S. Ct. 2562 (1988).
92. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300z-300z-10 (1981 & Supp. 1988).
93. Id. § 300z(b)(1), (2), and (4).
94. Id. § 300z-10(a). See also S. REP. No. 161, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 230 (1981) [here-
inafter SENATE REPORT]. The AFLA seeks "to encourage adolescents to bring their babies
to term." Id.
95. See, e.g., Benshoof, The Chastity Act: Government Manipulation of Abortion
Information and the First Amendment, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1916 (1988). Benshoof noted
that the original draft of the AFLA indicated that one of its purposes was to "promote
self-discipline and chastity." Id. at 1916 n.4 (citation omitted).
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framework96 by mentioning religion in four places. It provides:
(1) that problems of adolescent sexuality "are best approached
through a variety of integrated and essential services provided to
adolescents and their families by [among others] religious . . .
organizations; 9 7 (2) that federal programs "should emphasize
the provision of support by [among others] religious ... organi-
zations; '9 8 (3) that the AFLA "shall use such methods as will
strengthen the capacity of families ... to make use of support
systems such as . . . religious . . . organizations;"9 9 and (4) that
applicants for grant money must describe how they will "involve
religious . . . groups"100 (among others) in undertaking their
AFLA activities. The AFLA "lacks an express provision prevent-
ing the use of federal funds for religious purposes."' '
In addition, the legislative history of the AFLA establishes
that the involvement of religious groups was intended. Congress
concluded that "promoting the involvement of religious organi-
96. It was argued at trial that the legislative sponsors of the AFLA provided for
participation of religious groups in the AFLA because they wished to enlist the powerful
forces of religion in getting their message across and that, therefore, the AFLA was en-
acted for a wholly impermissible religious purpose. Both the federal district court for the
District of Columbia and the Supreme Court rejected this contention in their finding of a
valid secular purpose for the AFLA. See Kendrick v. Bowen, 657 F. Supp. 1547, 1558-59
(D.D.C. 1987); Bowen v. Kendrick, 108 S. Ct. 2562, 2571 (1988). Both courts found that
there was some valid legislative purpose in the enactment of the AFLA, and that this
was enough to satisfy the purpose prong of the Lemon test. See supra note 44 and ac-
companying text.
97. 42 U.S.C. § 300z(a)(8)(B) (1981 & Supp. 1988).
98. Id. § 300z(a)(10)(C).
99. Id. § 300z-2(a).
100. Id. § 300z-5(a)(21)(B).
101. 108 S. Ct. 2562, 2577 (1981). In 1984, three years after the AFLA was enacted
and the original grantees selected and funded, and with litigation under way, the Secre-
tary of HHS began to include, in the "Notice of Grant Award" to new grantees, a clause
which stated that public funds may not be used to "teach or promote religion." Kendrick
v. Bowen, 657 F. Supp. 1547, 1563 n.13 (D.D.C. 1987). The district court felt that this
was a case of too little, too late. 657 F. Supp. at 1563. The district court and the Su-
preme Court dissenters, 108 S. Ct. at 2591-94, thought that the absence of a statutory
restriction was significant, because the three cases which approved grant aid to relig-
iously affiliated colleges (Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736 (1976); Hunt v.
McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1973); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1972)) had relied on
such explicit assurances in approving the challenged aid. Chief Justice Rehnquist dis-
agreed, however, insisting that "if there were such a provision in this statute, it would be
easier to conclude that the statute on its face could not be said to have the primary
effect of advancing religion, but we have never stated that a statutory restriction is con-
stitutionally required." 108 S. Ct. at 2577 (citation omitted) (emphasis in original).
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zations in the solution to these problems is neither inappropriate
or illegal" but rather "would be a simple recognition that non-
profit religious organizations have a role to play in the provision
of services to adolescents. '" 102 Religion, according to the Senate
Committee, can help overcome "the limitations of Government
in dealing with a problem that has complex moral and social
"1103dimensions ....
A total of 141 AFLA grants were awarded between 1981 and
1988.104 In the words of Chief Justice Rehnquist, "[ilt is undis-
puted that a number of grantees or subgrantees were organiza-
tions with institutional ties to religious denominations,""1 5 and
"there is no dispute that the record contains evidence of specific
incidents of impermissible behavior by AFLA grantees."10 It is
also undisputed that a number of grantees, during the course of
their presentations to adolescents, made explicit linkage be-
tween specific religious tenets and the AFLA-authorized mes-
sage of sexual restraint, 10 7 and that some of the presentations
took place at private "sites adorned with religious symbols" and
were administered by members of religious orders.' 018
B. The District Court Decision
In 1983, a group of taxpayers, clergymen, 10 9 and the Ameri-
can Jewish Congress brought suit in the federal district court in
Washington, D.C., to have the AFLA declared unconstitutional
and to enjoin its enforcement. 10 Using the three-prong Lemon
102. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 94, at 16.
103. Id. at 15.
104. 108 S. Ct. at 2568. There is much that is unclear about the grantees because
during this initial period, HHS did not require that the grantees keep records of who
received funds as subgrantees. Id. at 2585 n.3 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
105. Id. at 2568.
106. Id. at 2580.
107. For example, by asserting that "the focus of sexuality [is] shifted to the total
person in Christ." Joint Appendix to Appellee's Brief at 427, Bowen v. Kendrick, 108 S.
Ct. 2562 (1988) (Nos. 87-253, 87-431, 87-462, and 87-775).
108. 657 F. Supp. 1547, 1566 (D.D.C. 1987).
109. The religious plaintiffs sued on the grounds that because of their pro-choice
views on abortion, they were ineligible for AFLA money, and that therefore the AFLA
discriminated against them by preferentially awarding money to other, antiabortion, reli-
gious groups. Brief for the Appellees at 5 n.10, Bowen v. Kendrick, 108 S. Ct. 2562 (1988)
(Nos. 87-253, 87-431, 87-462, and 87-775).
110. Kendrick v. Bowen, 657 F. Supp. 1547 (D.D.C. 1987).
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test to analyze the statute, the district court granted summary
judgment for the plaintiffs on April 15, 1987, finding the AFLA
unconstitutional both "on its face" and "as applied."'11
The court first found that the AFLA had a valid secular
purpose: "to solve the problems caused by teenage pregnancy
and premarital sexual relations." '112 However, because it had the
direct and immediate effect of advancing religion, the AFLA
failed the second prong of the Lemon test.11 3 Specifically, the
court cited section 300z-5(a)(21)(B), which requires grantees to
describe how they will involve religious organizations in provid-
ing services, as clearly having this effect.1 ' Further, the court
found that the AFLA subsidizes the teaching, by religiously affil-
iated grantees, of ideas that may be considered "fundamental
elements of religious doctrine." 1 5
The district court next found that the AFLA as applied vio-
lated the effects prong of the Lemon test. In administering the
AFLA, the HHS Secretary had allowed funds to go to "perva-
sively sectarian" institutions1 and had permitted within its
approved programs counseling and educational presentations
which "amount[ed] to the teaching of religion.""' The court,
however, did not make detailed findings about the nature of the
grantees, stating instead that "at least ten AFLA grantees or
subgrantees were themselves 'religious organizations' in the
sense that they have explicit corporate ties to a particular reli-
gious faith and by-laws or policies that prohibit any deviation
from religious doctrine." '
The AFLA funding of religious groups also violated the en-
tanglement prong of the Lemon test, according to the district
court. Since the primary activities of the AFLA were counseling
and teaching, a monitoring plan to successfully police the statute
111. Id. at 1551. The AFLA was declared unconstitutional and its enforcement was
enjoined only insofar as it pertained to "religious organizations." Id. at 1570.
112. Id. at 1558-59.
113. Id. at 1560.
114. Id. at 1562.
115. Id. "It is a fundamental tenet of many religions that premarital sex and abor-
tion are wrong, even sinful." Id. at 1563.
116. Id. at 1564. See also supra notes 68-72 and accompanying text.
117. Kendrick, 657 F. Supp. at 1564.
118. Id. at 1565. The court added that "[t]he religious character of other AFLA
grantees or subgrantees is not as explicit but is nonetheless indisputable." Id.
1989]
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would have to be so massive in scope as to constitute "excessive
entanglement."11 In fact, the court held "it is impossible to
comprehend entanglement more extensive and continuous than
that necessitated by the AFLA."'' °
Lastly, the district court found that the AFLA was likely to
incite the kind of political divisiveness that the establishment
clause was designed to prevent.1 21 This divisiveness would be
heightened because of the depth of feeling on both sides of the
abortion question 122 and because of the annual nature of the ap-
propriations process.'
2 3
C. The Supreme Court Decision
The district court decision was appealed directly to the
United States Supreme Court, which granted certiorari.' On
June 29, 1988, the Supreme Court, in a five to four decision, up-
held the AFLA's constitutionality on its face, and remanded the
case to the district court for consideration of whether, under cer-
tain criteria, the Act was unconstitutional as applied in specific
individual grants of federal funds.' 5
1. The Majority Opinion
In his majority opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist employed
the three-prong Lemon test to analyze the case.'12 The majority
agreed with the district court's finding that the AFLA was moti-
vated by a valid secular purpose: to remedy the problems caused
by adolescent sexuality.2 7 Next, the majority found, in contrast
to the district court, that the AFLA did not have the primary
119. Id. at 1568.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 1569.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Bowen v. Kendrick, 108 S. Ct. 326 (1987).
125. Bowen v. Kendrick, 108 S. Ct. 2562 (1988). Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote for
the majority (joined by Justices White, Scalia, Kennedy, and O'Connor), and Justice
Blackmun wrote for the dissent (joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens).
Justice Kennedy (joined by Justice Scalia) and Justice O'Connor also wrote brief concur-
ring opinions in which they commented on the standard to be applied by the district
court on remand. See infra note 149.
126. 108 S. Ct. at 2570.
127. Id. at 2571.
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effect of advancing religion. 2 '
In response to the conclusion of the district court that the
AFLA impermissibly advanced religion, the Bowen majority
made several points. First, according to the majority, the explicit
mention of religion four times in the text of the AFLA 2 9 "re-
flect[s] at most Congress' considered judgment that religious or-
ganizations can help solve the problems to which the AFLA is
addressed"130 and has only the "incidental and remote" effect of
advancing religion.131
Second, the Court found that the participation of religious
groups in the AFLA presented a situation similar to that con-
sidered in the aid to higher education cases - Tilton v.
Richardson,3 2 Hunt v. McNair,133 and Roemer v. Board of Pub-
lic Works.3 In those cases the Court had used a "pervasively
sectarian" test in upholding the grants of aid to religiously affili-
ated colleges.13 5 Under this test, aid is impermissible if it "flows
to an institution in which religion is so pervasive that a substan-
tial portion of its functions are subsumed in the religious mis-
sion . . ."136 Pervasively sectarian institutions are barred from
receiving federal funds because the manner in which such insti-
tutions use their grants cannot, with precision, be separated into
sectarian and nonsectarian components.1 37 In the three aid to
higher education cases, according to the Chief Justice, "it was
foreseeable that some proportion of the recipients of government
aid would be religiously affiliated, but that only a small portion
of these, if any, could be considered 'pervasively sectarian.' "I38
Since there had been no detailed findings with respect to the
specific character of the AFLA grantees, the Court reasoned that
128. Id. at 2571-77.
129. See supra notes 93-96.
130. 108 S. Ct. at 2573.
131. Id.
132. 403 U.S. 672 (1971).
133. 413 U.S. 734 (1973).
134. 426 U.S. 736 (1976).
135. See supra notes 65-76 and accompanying text.
136. Hunt, 413 U.S. at 743.
137. 108 S. Ct. 2562, 2574 (1988). "The reason for this is that there is a risk that
direct government funding, even if it is designated for specific secular purposes, may
nonetheless advance the pervasively sectarian institution's 'religious mission.'" Id.
138. Id. at 2575.
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the AFLA must be upheld.13
Third, the Court held that the district court was wrong to
conclude that the AFLA authorizes teaching on basic precepts of
religious doctrine.10 According to the Court, no such authoriza-
tion had occurred.141 Congress and certain religious groups
merely enjoyed a coincidence of views, and this fortuitous cir-
cumstance was "insufficient to warrant a finding that the statute
on its face has the primary effect of advancing religion.' 43
The majority also found that the AFLA did not violate the
entanglement prong of the Lemon test. 44 The Chief Justice re-
fused to accept "yet another 'Catch-22' argument: the very su-
pervision of the aid to assure that it does not further religion
renders the statute invalid.' 5 Since there had been no detailed
finding that the AFLA grantees were "pervasively sectarian" in
the same way that the Court had held parochial schools to be,
no need existed for the extensive supervision.'4  As for political
divisiveness, the Court simply stated that disagreement along
political lines with respect to this issue was not enough to invali-
date the Act. 147
The Court then remanded the case to the district court for
detailed consideration of whether certain grantees were perva-
sively sectarian in the same manner as parochial schools had
been classified.14 8 If this were found to be the case, the majority
found that the remedy would be to strike the individual grant,
139. But see supra note 118 and accompanying text.
140. 108 S. Ct. at 2576.
141. Id.
142. Id. "On an issue as sensitive and important as teenage sexuality, it is not sur-
prising that the government's secular concerns would either coincide or conflict with
those of religious institutions." Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 2578.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 2578 n.14.
148. Id. at 2580.
In particular, it will be open to appellees on remand to show that AFLA aid is
flowing to grantees that can be considered "pervasively sectarian" religious insti-
tutions, such as we have held parochial schools to be. As our previous discussion
has indicated, and as Tilton, Hunt, and Roemer make clear, it is not enough to
show that the recipient of a challenged grant is affiliated with a religious institu-
tion or that it is "religiously inspired."
Id. (citations omitted).
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not to declare the statute unconstitutional." 9
2. The Dissent
Justice Blackmun's dissent took issue with the majority's
use of the pervasively sectarian test, claiming that the majority
had incorrectly interpreted the test to mean that only parochial
schools are pervasively sectarian. 150 Justice Blackmun stated:
"On a continuum of 'sectarianism' running from parochial
schools at one end to the colleges funded by the statutes upheld
in Tilton, Hunt, and Roemer at the other, the AFLA grantees
described by the District Court clearly are much closer to the
former than the latter.1 151
The dissent accused the majority of relying on a phrase to
mask a refusal to make substantial inquiry. 5 According to Jus-
tice Blackmun, the fact that an institution is not classified as
pervasively sectarian is no excuse for failure to examine its spe-
cific potential for fostering religion in an unconstitutional
manner. 1
3
Justice Blackmun believed that the true precursor to the
AFLA case was not the sequence of higher education cases
-Tilton, Hunt, and Roemer - where the targeted audience was
the sophisticated college student, but rather the parochial school
cases starting with Lemon v. Kurtzman."" An important com-
mon thread in the latter sequence of cases, according to Justice
Blackmun, is the desire on the part of the Supreme Court to
149. Id. at 2581. There were two brief concurrences which addressed the issue of the
standard to be applied on remand. Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice Scalia, stated that
in his view the focus of the inquiry on remand should be "not whether the entity is of a
religious character, but how it spends its grant." Id. at 2582 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Justice O'Connor seemed to indicate that the AFLA might yet be found unconstitutional
as applied, stating "extensive violations - if they can be proved in this case - will be
highly relevant in shaping an appropriate remedy that ends such abuses." Id. at 2581
(emphasis in original) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
150. Id. at 2586 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
151. Id. at 2586-87.
152. Id. at 2585.
153. Id. at 2586.
154. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). The dissent in Bowen v. Kendrick, 108 S. Ct. 2582-97
(Blackmun, J., dissenting), cites Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985); School Dist. v.
Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977); Meek v. Pittenger, 421
U.S. 349 (1975); Levitt v. Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty, 413 U.S. 472
(1973). See supra note 63 for a brief description of these cases.
19891
21
PACE LAW REVIEW
protect highly impressionable young children from religious in-
doctrination. 155 Justice Blackmun felt that here, as in those
cases, the targeted audience is young and malleable, and thus
deserving of special prophylactic measures to insure that religion
is not impermissibly inculcated.15
The dissent found the evidence overwhelming that the
AFLA ftinding had the effect of advancing religion.1 57 The use of
religious personnel to perform a task - counseling sexual re-
straint - with respect to which there was no religious and polit-
ical unanimity was inherently non-neutral and consequently vio-
lated the establishment clause. 58 Justice Blackmun further
emphasized that "[plublic funds may not be used to endorse the
religious message."159 The dissent also argued that any at-
tempted grant-monitoring scheme would be excessively entan-
gling.16 0 Because of the special nature of the teacher-counselor
function, policing the AFLA program would, of necessity, be
overly intrusive. 161
IV. Analysis
A. The AFLA - Congress Undertakes Doctrinal Funding
In enacting the AFLA, Congress sought, for the first time,6 2
to enlist, by funding, the active participation of religious groups
155. 108 S. Ct. at 2589. "The AFLA, unlike any statute this Court has upheld, pays
for teachers and counselors, employed by and subject to the direction of religious author-
ities, to educate impressionable young minds on issues of religious moment." Id.
156. Id. "Where the targeted audience is composed of children, of course, the Court's
insistence on adequate safeguards has always been greatest." Id.
157. Id. at 2588.
158. Id. at 2591.
There is a very real and important difference between running a soup kitchen or a
hospital, and counseling pregnant teenagers on how to make the difficult decisions
facing them. The risk of advancing religion at public expense ... is much greater
when the religious organization is directly engaged in pedagogy, with the express
intent of shaping belief and changing behavior, than where it is neutrally dispens-
ing medication, food, or shelter.
Id. See Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291 (1899) (federal funds allowed to go to relig-
iously affiliated hospital).
159. 108 S. Ct. at 2591.
160. Id. at 2596 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
161. Id.
162. Neither the district court nor the Supreme Court was able to cite, in its opinion,
any other statute which had ever required the participation of religious groups in the
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in promoting a secular policy which it conceived to be in the
national interest."'3 According to the majority opinion in Bowen
v. Kendrick,"" whatever overt and improper linkage occurred
between religion and the valid legislative goal of promoting ado-
lescent sexual abstinence was caused by slipshod administration,
and not by any constitutional defect in the statute creating the
AFLA.165
This conclusion is open to question. The legislative history
is clear that Congress sought to include religious groups in
AFLA funding because of their spiritual zeal and special power
to communicate their views to adolescents."' While the subject
of this intended communication - the need for adolescent chas-
tity - was a topic on which Congress and certain religious
groups had a coincidence of viewpoint, this issue was clearly of
fundamental religious significance to the groups funded.1
6 7
Without in any way minimizing the role of ineffective oversight
in the problems of the AFLA, it is plain that this planned reli-
gious-governmental partnership raises a constitutional problem
by itself. May Congress, consistent with the establishment
clause, engage in selective funding of religious groups with which
it shares a particular philosophical point of view? After Bowen v.
Kendrick, this practice of doctrinal funding stands approved.
The Supreme Court had previously faced a similar prob-
lem in a different context. In Abington School District v.
carrying out of congressional policy. This researcher has not found any such statute
either.
163. In Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291 (1899), the Court upheld a federal grant to
a religiously affiliated hospital for the construction of buildings. This hospital had previ-
ously been incorporated by an act of Congress. Id. at 296. The new grant was upheld on
the grounds that the hospital charter was limited to the purpose of running a hospital,
and therefore the hospital could not be described as "a religious or sectarian body." 175
U.S. at 298. It would be difficult to consider this case to be precedent for judicial ap-
proval of the AFLA, where Congress funded religious groups to make presentations on
matters of doctrinal significance to those groups.
164. 108 S. Ct. 2562 (1988).
165. Id. at 2580.
166. SENATE REPORT, supra note 94, at 15-16.
167. Kendrick v. Bowen, 657 F. Supp. 1547, 1562 (D.D.C. 1987). "The AFLA ...
funds teaching and counseling of adolescents by religious organizations on matters re-
lated to religious doctrine." Id. at 1562. "Thus, by contemplating the provision of aid ...
for the purpose of encouraging abstinence and adoption - the AFLA contemplates sub-
sidizing a fundamental religious mission of those organizations." Id. at 1563. The AFLA
requires teaching "on matters inseparable from religious dogma .... " Id. at 1565.
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Schempp,165 the Court, in disallowing Bible readings and the
Lord's Prayer in public schools, rejected the state defense that
Bible readings did not advance religion, but would rather pro-
vide for "the promotion of moral values, the contradiction to the
materialistic trends of our times, the perpetuation of our institu-
tions and the teaching of literature. 16 9 The issue, the Court
said, was not whether religious practices could aid socially valid
goals, but whether such usage is a government endorsement of a
specific religious view.170 According to Justice Brennan, concur-
ring, "it seems to me that the State acts unconstitutionally. . if
it uses religious means to serve secular ends where secular means
would suffice." ' Congress' position in funding the AFLA ap-
pears similar to the rejected state position in Schempp. In both
cases government sought to use religion to achieve a valid secu-
lar goal involving adolescent behavior. In Schempp, however,
the offending statute was struck down, whereas in Bowen v.
Kendrick a large federal undertaking more ambitious than that
in Schempp was sustained.
The practice of using religious groups to deliver a govern-
ment favored secular message is clearly a perilous undertaking.
This practice involves the granting, by government, of denomi-
national preferences, something it has no right to do under even
the most relaxed view of the establishment clause.1 72 The fact
that the AFLA may be facially neutra a1 7 1 cannot obscure the re-
ality of the statute's selectivity. Religions have widely disparate
views on the questions of abortion and birth control, and to
favor one with funding over another in effect endorses the par-
ticular religious view funded.
168. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
169. Id. at 223.
170. Id. See also Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984). "Focusing on ... endorse-
ment or disapproval of religion clarifies the Lemon test as an analytical device." Id. at
689 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
171. 374 U.S. at 281.
172. See supra notes 14-20 and accompanying text.
173. The majority in Bowen v. Kendrick calls the AFLA "facially neutral" in several
places in its decision. See, e.g., 108 S. Ct. 2562, 2576 (1988). The Court recognized that:
"[tihe facially neutral projects authorized by the AFLA ... are not themselves 'specifi-
cally religious activities,' and they are not converted into such activities by the fact that
they are carried out by organizations with religious affiliations." Id. See Roemer v. Board
of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736 (1976). "[T]he State may send a cleric, even a clerical order,
to perform a wholly secular task." Id. at 746 (plurality opinion) (emphasis added).
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This endorsement may occur overtly, as it did in the case of
the unfortunate incidents ascribed to maladministration in
Bowen v. Kendrick7"' or it may occur with greater subtlety as
nonadherents merely feel excluded from the government spon-
sored orthodoxy.'7 5 Use of doctrinal funding imparts an aura of
religion, with all its potential for fanaticism,' 76 to what should be
essentially merit-based discussions about personal conduct. Gov-
ernment certainly has a duty to undertake programs which it
believes will promote health and happiness, but the government
does not have a monopoly on virtue. Such a monopoly is im-
plied, however, by the use of religious groups for achieving secu-
lar goals in the area of sexual morality because such usage en-
shrines one set of sectarian values as proper, while implicitly
denigrating other views. This cannot be anything but an estab-
lishment of religion.
The parameters of the doctrinal funding approved by the
Supreme Court in Bowen v. Kendrick are as yet unclear, but
some startling scenarios are conceivable following this case. Con-
gress may be tempted to fund religious speakers on issues more
overtly political than teenage chastity. Under the principle of
this case, for example, a Zionist group could arguably be funded
by Congress to proselytize for the government's Middle East
policy, since the views of the organization and the government
coincide. More dramatically, in the event of another unpopular
military conflict, the Bowen v. Kendrick principle of coincidence
could permit the federal funding for campus appearances of
members of a religious organization which supported the conflict
as "God's war."
174. 108 S. Ct. 2562 (1988).
175. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring). "En-
dorsement sends a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of
the political community, and an accompanying message to adherents that they are insid-
ers, favored members of the political community." Id.
176. Religious fanaticism is, sadly, much in the news today.
Reviled, sentenced to death by a religious authority, a price offered for his
head, forced to flee his home and live under guard - has ever a writer been per-
secuted as Salman Rushdie is?
Religious fanaticism has discovered censorship's Final Solution for that en-
emy of darkness, the word. I write that with a shudder.
Gordimer, Surely a Novel Can't Shake Islam, N.Y. Times, Feb. 22, 1989, at A27,
cols. 1,5.
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B. The Animating Principle Revisited
Since the decision in Everson v. Board of Education,177 two
theories of the underlying principle animating the adoption of
the establishment clause of the first amendment have competed
for the allegiance of the Supreme Court. The first theory is that
the clause requires the separation, as far as practicable, of gov-
ernment and religion - a "wall of separation" to use Jefferson's
famous phrase. 17 8 The other theory is that the religion clauses of
the first amendment, taken together, require only that the fed-
eral government create no established national church and make
no denominational preference between faiths. 79 The former
view had prevailed until the Supreme Court announced its deci-
sion in Bowen v. Kendrick.
In his dissent in Wallace v. Jaffree,8 ° Justice Rehnquist ex-
pressed the view that, based on his reading of history, "nothing
in the Establishment Clause . . . prohibit[s] Congress or the
States from pursuing legitimate secular ends through non-
discriminatory sectarian means."'' The decision in Bowen v.
Kendrick is inexplicable without a majority of the Supreme
Court embracing this view. Thus the decision in this case marks
the triumph, after forty years of debate, of an alternative view of
the history of the adoption of the establishment clause, and the
relegation to minority status of the separation view of that
event. 82
While such a view would arguably have changed the result
in some past decisions involving the establishment clause had it
prevailed at the time of decision, it should not have made any
difference in Bowen v. Kendrick. Ironically, this reversal of ma-
jority and minority views occurs in a case which demonstrates
precisely that denominational preference which even Justice
Rehnquist recognizes as constitutionally improper. 8 ' Even if we
concede that the establishment clause, as a matter of history,
177. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
178. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
179. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
180. 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
181. Id. at 113 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
182. See supra notes 19-25 and accompanying text.
183. See supra note 27.
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permits neutral aid to all religions, it is difficult to claim that the
AFLA aids all religions neutrally. In fact, this enactment singles
out certain religions for special preference in government fund-
ing. Admittedly, this preference does not appear in the wording
of the statute, but rather follows inevitably from the fact that
certain religious groups will receive funding because of their reli-
gious views, and others will not be recipients because they do
not share these views. There is no national religious unanimity
on questions of adolescent sexual behavior, and the government
may not constitutionally establish a preference for one religious
view over another.18 4
C. The Lemon Test After Bowen v. Kendrick
The Supreme Court has, since 1971, used the three-prong
Lemon test to analyze whether a statute or a practice violates
the establishment clause. To satisfy the Lemon test a program
must have a valid secular purpose, its primary effect must be
one that does not advance religion, and it must not create an
excessive entanglement between government and religion.185 In
analyzing entanglement, the Court considers three factors: the
character and purposes of the institution benefited, the nature
of the aid provided, and the resulting relationship between gov-
ernment and religious groups.'8 6 While resulting political divi-
siveness has never been sufficient by itself to make a statute un-
constitutional, the existence of political divisiveness has been a
factor considered by the Court in deciding a program's validity
under the establishment clause.'8 7
In applying the Lemon test, the Supreme Court has distin-
guished between aid to parochial schools and aid to religiously
affiliated colleges and universities. The former are deemed to be
"pervasively sectarian" institutions which may not receive gov-
ernment aid without some kind of supervisory government pres-
ence to insure that the money is not used to further the institu-
tional religious mission.188 The latter are deemed not pervasively
184. But see supra notes 97-101 and accompanying text.
185. See supra notes 46-51 and accompanying text.
186. See supra notes 52-57 and accompanying text.
187. See supra notes 40, 57 and accompanying text.
188. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
1989]
27
PACE LAW REVIEW
sectarian, and aid flowing to them will not require any supervi-
sion to insure that only the secular portion of the institutional
operation is aided.189 In Bowen v. Kendrick the Supreme Court
elevates this pervasively sectarian inquiry to a position of pre-
eminence within the Lemon test. Because the grantees and sub-
grantees were not, according to the Court, found with specificity
to be "'pervasively sectarian' religious institutions, such as [the
Court has] held parochial schools to be," 190 aid may be freely
provided to them without large-scale supervision.
This conclusion is logically suspect. The method of analysis
used when aid to an institution is challenged'' is inappropriate
here because the legislative goal of the AFLA is not to aid an
institution, but to use groups, some linked to religion, to achieve
a social goal. The institutional inquiry is a red herring in this
case, distracting us from an examination of a controversial appli-
cation of government funds.
The age of the class of persons to be potentially exposed to
the religious message is another factor that has received re-
peated attention from the Court in establishment clause cases. 92
The Justices have frequently stated that young, impressionable
children are highly receptive to perceiving a message of govern-
ment endorsement of religion, and, as a result, programs involv-
ing children must strike a balance in favor of preventing their
indoctrination. 93 Although the age group targeted by the AFLA
is the one previously held most vulnerable, the majority in
Bowen v. Kendrick ignores this critical concern in its opinion in
apparent disregard of the evidence in the record that some stu-
dents receiving AFLA counseling stated that they felt they were
189. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
190. 108 S. Ct. 2562, 2580 (1988).
191. The Court has analyzed challenges to institutional aid under the establishment
clause in two main areas: aid to parochial schools and aid to religiously affiliated institu-
tions other than parochial schools such as hospitals, colleges, and universities. See supra
notes 64-76 and accompanying text.
192. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
193. See, e.g., Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981). "University students are, of
course, young adults. They are less impressionable than younger students and should be
able to appreciate that the University's policy is one of neutrality towards religion." Id.
at 274 n.14. See also School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985). "The symbolism of a union
between church and state is most likely to influence children of tender years, whose ex-
perience is limited and whose beliefs consequently are the function of environment as
much as of free and voluntary choice." Id. at 390.
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being exposed to a religious presentation rather than a secular
one.
194
The most controversial feature of the Lemon test has been
the use of the entanglement prong to strike down enactments
which have a valid secular purpose and do not have the primary
effect of advancing religion. This controversy reached an acrimo-
nious stage in Aguilar v. Felton,19 5 when four Justices called for
the end of the use of entanglement prong analysis.19 After
Bowen v. Kendrick, it is apparent that a majority of the Court
will not use the entanglement prong as it was previously used.
Justices Scalia and Kennedy apparently agree with the "Catch-
22 paradox" view of entanglement expressed by Justice
Rehnquist's majority opinion, and Justices O'Connor and White
have previously expressed their distaste for the use of that
prong. 197
It is again ironic that such a shift in the viewpoint of the
Court should have resulted from this case, when other cases had
presented a much more appropriate setting for such a decision.
For example, it is not impossible to sympathize with the dissent-
ers in Aguilar; in that case programs were struck down198 which
in the words of Justice Powell "concededly have 'done so much
good and little, if any, detectable harm,' "199 merely because
there was a "risk of government entanglement in the adminis-
tration of the religious schools."2 ° In Aguilar, it was conceded
that no actual religious inculcation had materialized in nineteen
years, and the monitoring scheme was minimal. 0 1 Thus the act
194. Kendrick v. Bowen, 657 F. Supp. 1547, 1566 (D.D.C. 1987).
195. 473 U.S. 402 (1985).
196. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
197. See supra notes 86-92 and accompanying text.
198. New York City had created programs which used federal funds to provide in-
struction for educationally deprived parochial school students. The programs were con-
ducted on parochial school grounds by public school teachers who were formally required
to separate themselves from any religious activities taking place at those schools. Agui-
lar, 473 U.S. at 404-07.
199. Id. at 415 (quoting the lower court at 739 F.2d 48, 72 (2d Cir. 1984)) (Powell, J.,
concurring).
200. Id. (emphasis added).
201. Id. at 424 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). "Indeed, in 19 years there has never been
a single incident in which a Title I instructor 'subtly or overtly' attempted to 'indoctri-
nate the students in particular religious tenets at public expense.' " Id. (citing School
Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 397 (1985)).
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of striking down the statute was purely prophylactic.
In stark contrast to the challenged program in Aguilar, seri-
ous improprieties had already been committed by AFLA grant-
ees prior to the moment of judicial decision. 202 Further, the en-
tanglement resulting from an attempt to police the AFLA would
not be minimal, since it would necessitate the constant surveil-
lance of teachers and counselors with a predisposition to reli-
gious fervor - a task the Court has previously found difficult."'
Such an effort would have to be national in scope, since the
AFLA is itself a national program, and would involve an admin-
istrative determination of the religious content of secular curric-
ula - a daunting prospect. If ever there existed a statute that
would, under previous Supreme Court decisions,"" administra-
tively entangle church and state, the AFLA is such an act. Yet
the AFLA was upheld, whereas the far less "entangling" statute
in Aguilar was struck down.
Another part of the Lemon analysis abandoned by the
Court in Bowen v. Kendrick is the political divisiveness inquiry.
Although the district court discussed the political divisiveness
caused by the AFLA at some length,0 5 the majority opinion dis-
missed the subject in a footnote. '06 The cases previously consid-
ered make clear that the Court has, on some occasions, consid-
ered political divisiveness an evil to be remedied by the first
202. Bowen v. Kendrick, 108 S. Ct. 2562, 2580 (1988). "[T]here is no dispute that the
record contains evidence of specific incidents of impermissible behavior by AFLA grant-
ees .... " Id.
203. For the distinction between providing teachers and textbooks to parochial
schools, see supra note 51 and accompanying text.
204. For use of the entanglement prong see Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602
(1971); Aguilar, 473 U.S. 402; School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985); Wolman v. Wal-
ter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975).
205. Kendrick v. Bowen, 657 F. Supp. 1547, 1569 (D.D.C. 1987).
206. 108 S. Ct. 2578 n.14.
We also disagree with the District Court's conclusion that the AFLA is invalid
because it is likely to create political division along religious lines. It may well be
that because of the importance of the issues relating to adolescent sexuality there
may be a division of opinion along religious lines as well as other lines. But the
same may be said of a great number of other public issues of our day. In addition,
as we said in Mueller v. Allen, the question of "political divisiveness" should be
"regarded as confined to cases where direct financial subsidies are paid to paro-
chial schools or to teachers in parochial schools."
Id. (citations omitted).
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amendment,0 7 and that the potential for such divisiveness could
be the deciding factor in a close case.20 8 It is difficult to conceive
of a more politically divisive issue than the moral ramifications
of abortion and adolescent sexual abstinence have proven to be
in the late twentieth century United States. Given the added
fact that the AFLA does not involve a "one shot" funding
scheme, passions will be continuously stirred by the need for
ongoing congressional appropriations for the AFLA. In short, if
the Court could find no political divisiveness to consider in this
case, it may never find it, and the inquiry is discarded.
It is difficult to ascertain what remains of the Lemon test as
a whole after Bowen v. Kendrick. Certainly the test was not ap-
plied in its customary manner with respect to the AFLA. Justice
Brennan's acerbic comment on an earlier Supreme Court failure
to properly apply the Lemon test is most appropriate here: "In
sum, I have no doubt that, if any group of law students were
asked to apply the principles of Lemon to the question.. . they
would nearly unanimously find the practice to be unconstitu-
tional."' 9 The same could be said about the AFLA challenged in
Bowen v. Kendrick.
V. Conclusion
Bowen v. Kendrick21 ° marks a watershed in judicial inter-
pretation of the establishment clause. By this decision, the Su-
preme Court has eviscerated the Lemon test, which had been its
primary analytical tool in establishment clause cases since 1971.
Tests in areas of constitutional law are sometimes justly criti-
cized because they focus on form over substance, and the Lemon
test had been criticized, by the very Justice who authored the
Lemon opinion, as "suggest[ing] a naive pre-occupation with an
easy, bright-line approach for addressing constitutional is-
sues."2" ' If the rigorous application of the Lemon test would
have prevented the result in Bowen v. Kendrick, however, then
207. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
208. Justice Powell seems ultimately to be most influenced by this factor in his deci-
sive concurrence in Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 416-17 (Powell, J., concurring). See also supra
note 40 and accompanying text.
209. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 800-01 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
210. 108 S. Ct. 2562 (1988).
211. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 89 (1985) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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there is much to be said for it.
In abandoning the Lemon test, the Court has approved the
practice of doctrinal funding of religious groups which share the
prevailing government opinion on controversial issues. This deci-
sion is profoundly disturbing since it approves an unprecedented
church-state alliance on issues which sharply divide the nation.
The eloquent warning of Justice Jackson is appropriate here: "If
there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is
that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be ortho-
dox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion
.... "I2 In upholding the AFLA, the Supreme Court has taken a
step towards allowing the creation of just such an orthodoxy.
Richard L. Marasse
212. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
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